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Introduction
 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Canada’s current Arctic foreign policy, with a 
focus on its efforts to claim the Northwest Passage as internal waters, from a critical 
perspective. The ultimate conclusion will be that Canada should move away from its 
current complex neorealist approach and re-embrace liberal internationalism in order to 
formulate the most effective Northwest Passage regime.
 In his book The Northward Course of Empire, Arctic hero Vilhjalmur Stefansson wrote 
that through history, the North had become increasingly more important. Global power 
had shifted more and more Northward from Babylon and Alexandria to Paris, London, 
and New York. He argued that while man as an animal was indeed tropical, advances in 
technology brought with it the ability and desire to move North. While it is currently 
thought by a majority that civilization has moved as Northward as possible, one must 
note that civilizations in the past had the same belief proven wrong.1 Indeed, Stefansson 
believed that commercial progress made civilization capable of developing anywhere on 
the globe:
 We have not come to the limit of commercial progress. There was many a pause but no stop to the 
westward course of empire until we came to the place where East is West. In that sense only is there a 
northward limit to progress. Corner lots in Rome were precious when the banks of Thames had no value; 
the products of Canada were little beyond furs and fish when the British and French agreed in preferring 
Guadelupe. But values have shifted north since then and times have changed. Times will continue to 
change. There is no northern boundary beyond which productive enterprise cannot go till North meets 
North on the opposite shores of the Arctic Ocean as East has met West on the Pacific.2   
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1 Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The Northward Course of Empire (Harvard:Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), 
pp.1-20.
2 Stefansson, pp.19. 
 Stefansson called this the “path of supremacy,” and all signs seem to indicate that due 
to climate change and improved technology, development in the Arctic is becoming a 
real possibility. Resources like oil and gas among others are abundant and more 
accessible, and the melting sea ice is resulting in increasingly traversable seaways. One 
of the northern seaways that is attracting a considerable attention is the Northwest 
Passage. 
 Seen as a valuable shortcut from Europe to Asia, the Northwest Passage could become 
an important shipping route, and Canada wants to be able to control it. However, the 
current Conservative Party government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper has led an 
aggressive, complex neorealist approach to securing sovereignty over the Passage 
consisting of loud diplomacy, military drills, and rejection of multilateral cooperation in 
the region. But this strategy that perceives Canada as a principle power is not 
sustainable. The government must accept that Canada simply cannot afford to 
unilaterally control and develop the Northwest Passage, and a liberal internationalist 
approach is what is needed. Rather than continuing to fight for international 
acknowledgment that the Passage is a domestic strait, Canada needs to recognize that 
the strait can be managed and developed much more effectively if it oversaw a 
multilateral development effort through the International Maritime Organization.
 This thesis will consist of five chapters: 1. The history of Canada and the Northwest 
Passage, 2. The benefits of a more accessible Arctic, 3. Challenges to developing a 
more open Arctic, 4. Three theoretical perspectives of Canadian foreign policy, 5. 
Returning to multilateralism: and effective Northwest Passage policy.
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 Chapter one will give the reader a brief history of Canada’s Arctic policy, specifically 
focusing on the Northwest Passage. It will cover details from the pre cold war to present 
day in order to demonstrate how the importance of the Arctic is increasing as it becomes 
more accessible. The chapter will also look at some of the security implications of Arctic 
development, focusing on the circumpolar powers of Canada, United States, Russia, as 
well as the NATO and Arctic Council organizations.
 Chapter two will look at the economic potential of a more accessible Arctic. Oil and gas 
development, mining operations, as well as potential sources of alternative energy are 
all things that Canada can cash in on. The chapter will also look at the benefits of the 
Northwest Passage as a viable shipping route, the advancements in Arctic shipping 
technology, and why it’s beneficial for Canada to have control over it. 
 Chapter three will examine the challenges to developing the Northwest Passage. Risks 
to the Arctic’s incredibly sensitive environment, as well as the indigenous people who 
depend on it will be discussed. Next, the lack of infrastructure and other barriers to 
developing the Passage will be looked at, along with the considerable security and 
surveillance issues. 
 Chapter four will cover the three main theoretical perspectives of Canadian foreign 
policy. The three perspectives covered are: 1. Peripheral dependency, which views 
Canada as a small, penetrated power, 2. Liberal internationalism, which views Canada 
as a middle power, 3. Complex neorealism, which views Canada as a principle power. 
The chapter will conclude that the current government of Canada’s foreign policy is 
being conducted in a complex neorealist manner.
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 Chapter five will propose a more realistic Northwest Passage policy than the one that 
the current Canadian government is pursuing. The chapter will first argue that a return to 
the liberal internationalist form of multilateralism will be the most effect Arctic policy for 
Canada. Then it will look at some alternative means of gaining control over the Passage, 
such as going through the International Court of Justice or through the Arctic Council. 
But the chapter will ultimately conclude that recognizing the Northwest Passage as an 
international strait and pursuing a Canadian led international regime through the 
International Maritime Organization in which all states using the Passage are required to 
contribute will be more cost effective and productive than Canada trying to unilaterally 
manage it as a domestic strait.         
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Chapter 1- History of Canada and the Northwest Passage
1.1: Pre-Cold War history
 There is no consensus on where one should start with Canada’s history in the 
Northwest Passage, but an ideal place to start is with the iconic Franklin expedition of 
1845. Determined to be the first power to find a shortcut from Europe to the Pacific, 
Victorian England sent a crew of two ships and 134 men led by Sir John Franklin on a 
mission to find the coveted Northwest Passage. All that is known about the fate of this 
expedition is that the ship became lodged in pack ice on September 12, 1846 and none 
of the crew members survived. 
 While this more than a century old expedition may seem irrelevant to the reader, the 
significance of it is that Canada’s current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, seems keen 
on finding the elusive shipwreck in an effort to cement the expedition into Canadian 
folklore. In doing this, Harper is attempting to garner enough support to develop 
Canada’s enormous portion of the Arctic, something that no previous Canadian Prime 
Minister has ever managed to do in any significant manner.3  
 Following Canadian Confederation in 1867, there was a sense of urgency to confirm the 
legal status of the Canadian territory. Britain did its part by transferring its Arctic land to 
Canada in 1880, and the Canadian government took it a step further by purchasing 
Rupert’s Land (known today as the Nunavut and Northwest Territories) from the 
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3 Kat Long, (May 19, 2014). “Canada’s Prime Minister is Obsessed With a Missing Explorer.” Slate. Link: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/05/
canada_search_for_franklin_expedition_nationalism_and_control_of_northwest.2.html:
Hudson’s Bay Company. The purchase of Rupert’s Land included the islands of the 
Arctic Archipelago, where the Northwest Passage runs through. 4 
Figure 1: The route of the Northwest Passage. Source: http://arcticecon.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/the-
northwest-passage-dispute-canada-map-with-exclusive-economic-zones/
1.2: Cold War  
 Canada’s sovereignty over the Archipelago went almost completely unchallenged until 
1969, when an Exxon oil supertanker named the Manhattan navigated through the 
Northwest Passage without asking for Canada’s permission. The Government of 
Canada saw this as a telling sign that the legal status of their Arctic region was 
somewhat ambiguous, and they responded by enacting the Arctic Waters Pollution Act in 
1970. The act extended Canada’s jurisdiction of its Arctic waters by 100 nautical miles in 
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4 Kevin Du, (2007). “Canada’s Ice Rush To Claim the North Pole and the Northwest Passage.” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, 30(4). pp.837.
order to enforce pollution standards on ships passing through. Canada also extended its 
sovereign territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles. In doing so, Canada sought 
to vastly increase its Arctic sovereignty unilaterally because, as Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau (in office 1968-1979, 1980-1984) argued, the international law at the time was 
not effective when it came to protecting the ecology of Canada’s Arctic waters.5 
 Activity staid relatively quiet until August 1985, when the USCGC Polar Sea icebreaker 
voyaged through the Northwest Passage from Thule, Greenland, to Prudhoe Bay, 
Alaska. Even though they knew this was a sensitive issue in Canada, the Americans did 
not regard it as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty. While the Americans did eventually 
notify the Canadian Government of the voyage, the Canadian public was outraged, as 
they viewed the expedition as a violation of their sovereignty. Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney (in office 1984-1993) responded by implementing straight baselines in the 
Arctic, and claimed the enclosed area as Canada’s historical internal waters.6 The 
Americans did not agree with these baselines and have argued that the Northwest 
Passage is an international strait until present day. 
 In 1988, US President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the 
Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. In a way, this action was the 
two governments making an “agree to disagree” policy, as the agreement requires the 
United States to ask permission for its ships to transit through the Northwest Passage, 
Heffernan                                                                                                                                                   9     
5 Ibid, pp.839
6 Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, (2009). “Politics, Pride, and Precedent: The United States and Canada in the 
Northwest Passage.” Ocean Development and International Law, 40. pp.212.
and the Canadians must grant permission.7 As comical as it may seem, this agreement 
has actually functioned well since its implementation.
1.3: Post-Cold War to present
 The end of the Cold War led to a steep decline in the Arctic’s strategic significance.8 
With the Soviet threat gone, there was no longer a focus on developing defense 
infrastructure in order to quell potential attacks coming from over the Arctic. For the next 
decade, the Arctic region would be gradually demilitarized.
 The new millennium brought with it new Arctic aspirations from all Arctic parties 
involved. From an environmental standpoint, it has become increasingly evident that 
climate change is having disastrous effects in the Arctic. Studies have shown that the 
Arctic is one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, and its annual 
temperature has increased at almost twice the rate as the rest of the world over the past 
few decades.9 This is causing a variety of changes in the region, including: melting 
permafrost; longer sea-ice free seasons; the invasion of mosquitos and black flies, which 
brings the risk of new diseases; unpredictable sea ice conditions; melting glaciers10. 
These changes obviously have devastating consequences for local environments and 
wildlife, but the Arctic governments seem to see opportunity in the situation. 
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7 Philip J. Briggs, (1990). “The Polar Sea Voyage and the Northwest Passage Dispute.” Armed Forces & 
Society 16/3. pp.446
8 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic. (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), pp.118.
9 Heather A. Smith. (2010). “Choosing not to see: Canada, climate change, and the Arctic.” International 
Journal. 65(4). pp.937,938.
10 Lee-Anne Broadhead. (2010). “Canadian sovereignty versus northern security.” International Journal, 
65(4). pp.913,914.
 As the Arctic ice melts at a faster rate every year, new shipping passages are available 
for increasingly longer periods of time, and the Northwest Passage is no exception. 
Compared to the Panama Canal, this route is a 7000-kilometer shortcut between Asia 
and the United States’ Atlantic seaboard.11 Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative government has continued to build upon the long Canadian history of 
claiming sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.
 The Harper Government seems to have a policy of welcoming the effects that climate 
change is having in Canada’s Arctic, as if they see it as a region that can be exploited to 
produce enormous economic wealth rather than an extremely fragile ecosystem that 
needs to be protected. Since coming into parliamentary office in 2006, the Conservative 
party has openly denounced the Kyoto protocol, calling the commitments “unachievable” 
and incorrectly claiming that Canada only emits a small percentage of global emissions. 
The Harper government has even been accused of trying to undermine international 
climate negotiations. The Conservative party’s policy of turning a blind eye to climate 
change was eventually solidified when they pulled out of the Kyoto protocol in 2011. 
While the Harper government does acknowledge that it exists, it vehemently denies that 
Canada is contributing to the problem, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.12
 It is not hard to see why the Harper government has taken this approach to climate 
change and the Kyoto protocol. While the number one reason would be the 
Conservative Party’s unbridled support of development in the Alberta oil sands, the vast 
potential resource wealth and opening of new transit routes in the melting Canadian 
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11 Michael Byers. (2010). “Cold peace: Arctic cooperation and Canadian foreign policy.” International 
Journal, 65(4). pp.901.
12 Smith, pp.938-940.
Arctic is also clearly behind its anti-climate change agenda. A US Geological Survey 
released in 2008 projected there to be 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil reserves and 
44 million barrels of undiscovered natural gas liquids in the Arctic.13 As the Arctic ice 
continues to melt, it seems inevitable that the Canadian government will continue to 
increase its grasp of the region, and this has been done through asserting its 
sovereignty in the region. Prime Minister Harper has clearly shown his high aspirations 
for the region with frequent Arctic trips and constantly linking sovereignty with resource 
development. Many of his speeches regarding the Arctic include quotes such as this: “In 
defending our nation’s sovereignty, nothing is as fundamental as protecting Canada’s 
territorial integrity; our borders, our airspace and our waters. More and more, as global 
commerce routes chart a path to Canada’s North and as the oil, gas and minerals of this 
frontier become more valuable, northern resource development will grow ever more 
critical to our country.”14
1.4 Circumpolar security implications
 The opening of the new Arctic frontier is creating new tensions between the Arctic 
nations and there are four main factors that are contributing to this. First, the opening up 
of the Arctic sea is creating new shipping opportunities, and ninety percent of 
international trade travels by sea. Second, demand for oil and gas will only continue to 
go up, and there appears to be plenty of it in the Arctic. Third, more and more new 
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13 Broadhead, pp.925. 
14 D. McRae, (2007). “Arctic sovereignty? What is at stake?” Behind the headlines, 64(1). pp.8. 
technology - including drilling technology and icebreaker designs - is being created that 
is capable of operating in the extreme climate of the Arctic. Finally, increased activity and 
more ships traveling through the area will bring new threats to national security. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the USA in particular has placed port, vessel, and waterway 
safety under scrutiny.15
 This section will look at some of the different circumpolar countries - with a specific 
focus on Canada and its sovereignty campaign in the Northwest Passage - and 
organizations and how they are reacting to these new Arctic security dilemmas. 
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15 Kraska, pp.1115
   
    Figure 2: NATO members’ existing and planned capabilities for Arctic operations.16
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16 Helga Haftendorn, (2011). “NATO and the Arctic: Is the Atlantic alliance a Cold War relic in a peaceful 
region now faced with non-military challenges?” European Security, 20(3). Table 1, pp.344.
 Canada
 The process of re-militarizing the Canadian Arctic for the first time since the Cold War 
was actually started by the Canadian Liberal party in 2002,17 and has been continued by 
the current Conservative government on a larger scale. Some examples of the scale of 
militarization in the region include: three armed icebreakers have been based at a new 
military and civilian deep-water docking facility near Iqaluit; a commitment to an Arctic 
national sensor system, including underwater surveillance technologies; the promise of 
air surveillance; a new Arctic military training centre in Resolute Bay; 1,000 additional 
Canadian rangers with increased levels of training and equipment; an airborne battalion 
with rapid emergency response capability; eight polar-class 5 Arctic offshore patrol 
ships; and the refurbishment of a deepwater port on Baffin Island.18    
 In addition, there has also been an increase in military exercises in the region, called 
Operation Nanook, which takes place every year in remote areas and harsh conditions 
in order to display to Canada and the world that the Canadian forces are ready to 
respond to threats.19 There has also been heightened defensive rhetoric to go along with 
these operations. For example, after Russia announced its intention to drop 
paratroopers at the north pole for a military exercise in 2010, Canadian defense minister 
Peter MacKay aggressively stated that Canada was going to “protect our sovereign 
territory. We’re always going to meet any challenge to that territorial sovereignty, and I 
can assure you any country that is approaching Canadian airspace, approaching 
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17 Byers, pp.903. 
18 Whitney Lackenbauer. (2010). “Mirror images? Canada, Russia, and the circumpolar world.” 
International Journal, 65(4). pp.892,893.
19 Broadhead, pp.919,920.
Canadian territory, will be met by Canadians.”20 It seems apparent that Canada feels the 
need to act quickly before other forces from outside the region move in and claim the 
trillions of dollars in valuable natural resources.21 
 The Northwest Passage is one of the most important drivers of the Harper 
Government’s increased assertion of sovereignty, and they seem to also have the 
support of a majority of the Canadian Parliament when it comes to this matter. This was 
made evident in December 2009, when the House of Commons voted to rename the 
Northwest Passage the Canadian Northwest Passage.22 This move was perhaps only 
symbolic, but a strong sign of intent nonetheless. Canada has attempted to demonstrate 
its intent to control the Passage by stepping up both the number and intensity of military 
exercises in the region, as well as the announcement of plans to purchase up to eight 
armed icebreaker patrol vessels. The military infrastructure around the passage is also 
set to grow, with the previously mentioned Winter Warfare Training Centre in Resolute 
Bay and a military deep-water port in Nanisivik.23 
 Currently, the Northwest Passage is recognized by the United Nations Laws of the Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS) as a combination of territorial seas, the Canadian exclusive 
economic zone, and an international strait open to the international community.24 
Therefore, Canada’s sovereignty claims currently go against the Laws of the Sea. When 
looking at the Canada-US dispute over the Passage, one would initially think that this 
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21 Dobransky, pp.11.
22 Frederic Lasserre, (2011). “Arctic Shipping Routes.” International Journal, pp.794. 
23 Sharp, pp.305,306. 
24 James Kraska, (2009). “International security and international law in the Northwest Passage.” 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42(1109). pp.1118.
fact gives the United States the upper hand. However, the United States has never 
signed onto the Convention, as the move has been continuously rejected by a handful of 
powerful US senators.
 UNCLOS is essentially the constitution of the sea, and for the United States to reject it 
means that its self-interest is being placed above conflict avoidance, international peace 
and security, and global stability. It also means that it has no legitimate means of 
disputing Canada’s claim over the Northwest Passage. Therefore, the resulting situation 
we are left with is both the United States and Canada disputing sovereignty over the 
Passage by unilateral means only. 
 What the United States is so concerned about with recognizing Canadian sovereignty in 
the Northwest Passage is the precedent that it would set for the Strait of Hormuz. 
Hormuz is a strategically important waterway between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian 
Gulf, and is in fact the sole waterway that leads out of the Persian Gulf. This strait is 
used for a third of the world’s seaborne oil trade, and is seen as vitally important to 
America’s energy security.25 The US believes that if the Northwest Passage is 
recognized as Canada’s internal waters, Iran could point to that as no different than their 
situation and claim sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. 
 If Iran were to take control of the Strait of Hormuz, it would no doubt have a great deal 
of control and leverage on world trade.26 An example of how this could be problematic is 
the recent tensions involving Iran and its nuclear power initiatives. When world powers 
tightened economic sanctions on Iran in order to deter its nuclear program, Iran 
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26 Caitlin Talmadge, (2008). “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” 
International Security, Summer, pp.86
responded by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. This move would have greatly 
disrupted the global energy market, as the blockade would create supply disruptions and 
increase the price of oil by about $3 US a barrel.27 The United States immediately 
moved to condemn the potential blockade, threatening to use military force to keep the 
Strait open. 
 While the crisis was eventually alleviated, an Iran with sovereign control over the 
Hormuz could have reacted more aggressively, sending speedboats, submarines, 
warships, and anti cruise and ballistic missiles to cause difficulties in the waterway.28 
This could have triggered a potentially deadly military conflict. Obviously, recognizing 
Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage would not lead to anywhere near the 
tensions just mentioned. Canada does not have the history of political and military 
conflict that is currently happening in the Middle East, and it is unlikely that it would ever 
threaten to use military force to close down the Northwest Passage if that waterway ever 
reaches the importance of the Hormuz.29 However, the threat remains that recognizing 
Canadian sovereignty over the Passage would potentially give Iran justification for 
claiming the Strait of Hormuz as internal waters. 
 This dispute has strained Canada and US relations, and both sides are guilty. Canada’s 
government parties on both the right and the left are guilty of using Canadian 
exceptionalism in the Arctic and rejecting multilateralism in order to score political points 
at home.30 The United States on the other hand needs to ratify the UNCLOS in order to 




30 Kraska, pp.1120. 
allow both countries to have a proper platform to have their discussion. What is 
especially crucial is that this dispute is solved before shipping and development in the 
area begins to pick up, or else it could be a missed opportunity for both countries.
United States
 The United States’ Arctic Region Policy sets a very hard tone:
The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is 
prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. 
These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air 
systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; 
and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.31
This paragraph, along with the fact that the United States is the only Arctic nation that 
has not ratified the UNCLOS, should imply that they have a more isolationist approach 
to the region than most other countries. However, this is not entirely true. In practice, the 
United States has been quite actively participating in international organizations such as 
the Arctic Council that work together to address Arctic issues. But this is not to say the 
US has a full multilateral policy in the Arctic either. They have been opponents of 
proposals to give the Arctic Council a broader mandate that would extend beyond 
environmental and sustainable development.32 There are clearly several areas where 
regional interests and American interests collide.
 What might be surprising to some when considering its global military dominance, the 
US is just as inadequately equipped to patrol the high north as its Arctic neighbours. 
After 9/11, funding for polar research was dramatically cut, and the US was left with only 
Heffernan                                                                                                                                                   19   
31 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66 Arctic Region Policy (9 Jan., 2009), section B para. 
1. Link: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm 
32 Ibid, section C para. 2.
three Arctic-capable icebreakers.33 But this does not mean the United States is not 
patrolling the Arctic by other means. American submarines are regularly patrolling the 
Arctic, including the Northwest Passage. This is a tricky subject because Canada does 
not have adequate underwater radars to detect submarines, and therefore simply relies 
on goodwill from the Americans as well as other foreign submarines passing through to 
notify them of their transit. “We do not discuss the movement of allied [nations’] 
submarines,” says Canadian navy spokesman Lieutenant-Commander John Coppard, 
“One would expect that a naval vessel transiting Canadian waters would seek the 
appropriate diplomatic clearances.”34 Some believe that this could cause harm to 
Canada’s sovereignty bid. Experts like Michael Byers see any unauthorized ships going 
through Canadian Arctic waters without consequence as a signal to the world that 
Canada is not able to back up its own sovereignty claims.35
 There doesn’t seem to be anything Canada can do to force the US navy to respect its 
sovereignty claims, and it appears that the US has no intention of doing so in the near 
future. In 2002, the US navy even held a symposium called “Naval operations in the ice-
free Arctic” that discussed the idea of sending full battle groups into the Northwest 
Passage.36  While this is by no means a plan set in stone, Canada should be very 
alarmed at the total disregard shown towards its claims of sovereignty. 
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35 Ibid.
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Russia
 Russia sees the Arctic as one the main tools it can use in order to re-assert its 
superpower status, which has been revived under the rule of current President Vladimir 
Putin. Russia believes the Arctic offers compensation for the losses of territory and 
influence that resulted due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It seems that Russian 
territorial claims in the Arctic are going hand in hand with Russian military 
modernization.37 The Russian Strategy through 2020, prepared by the Russian Security 
Council and signed by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009, says that there is rivalry for 
control of resources in various parts of the Arctic and that the possibility of military 
confrontation cannot be ruled out.38 It states that Arctic resources will become the critical 
point for the world military balance.39 The paper also suggests creating a new military 
force for the Arctic, and making the region Russia’s leading strategic base by 2016. The 
military fleet has been given a new task to protect Russian economic interests in the 
Arctic, in addition to its continued role of making Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces, 
which are strongest pillars of Russian security, impervious to attack.40 
 Russian aspirations in the Arctic were highlighted by the planting of the Russian flag on 
the seabed of the North Pole in 2007. While this move was purely symbolic, it was 
followed by a media frenzy in Russia which sparked nationalist jubilation. Also in 2007 
the Russian air force resumed long-range strategic bomber patrol flights over the Arctic, 
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39 Kraska, pp.1117. 
40 Yuri Golotyuk, (2008). “Safeguarding the Arctic.” Russia in Global Affairs, 3. Link: http://
eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11281
which had been suspended after the Cold War ended. These flights were joined by 
tankers, escort freighters and reconnaissance aircraft. In 2008 Moscow announced that 
a Northern Fleet submarine completed a 30-day transit under the Arctic ice.41 This 
Russian showing of strength and ambition was a clear sign that the race for Arctic 
resources was heating up. 
 Russia’s Arctic neighbours have reacted to this major shift in different ways. On the one 
hand, Norway is relaxed about what it sees as a return to a more normal level of activity 
from its mighty neighbour that has a long history of legitimate interests in the region.42 
On the other hand, Canada has had mixed reactions. While it has at times voiced its 
concerns regarding Russian militarization of the region, other times Canada has seemed 
passive. For example, when Canadian navy Sub-Lt. Jeffrey Paul Delisle pleaded guilty 
to spying for Russia over a period of four and a half years, there was little condemnation 
from Canada.43 In fact, despite the sometimes inflammatory rhetoric and military drills, 
the two nations have worked well together diplomatically.  
 The reality is that, at this moment, Russia seems content to pursue its Arctic ambitions 
through international law and diplomacy. It appears to believe that it has law and 
scientific evidence on its side, and has demonstrated this optimism through a claim of 
740,300 square kilometres of the Arctic seabed (nearly half of the entire seabed) to the 
United Nations Commission of the Continental Shelf.44 However, should this bid fail, or 
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should legal and procedural methods fail to give Russia the resources it wants, there is a 
chance that Russia could try to assert control over Arctic resources and territory by other 
means.45 
NATO
 Due to the remnants of the Cold War, NATO’s integrated air-defence system, including 
fighters on alert and airborne warning and control surveillance flights means that the 
alliance is still present in the Arctic. It now appears that the organization could adopt a 
higher profile in the region. Countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and 
Finland have called for more NATO collaboration in the area: “There is a need for a 
renewed focus on security challenges in and around Allied territory...regular activities in 
a NATO framework would demonstrate collective solidarity.”46 The Nordic countries are 
not necessarily proposing full cooperation with NATO- they rather want a regional 
agreement that allows non-members Finland and Sweden to cooperate more closely 
with the Nordic NATO members. Among these proposals is a closer defence and 
security policy that includes recommendations for a Nordic maritime monitoring system 
in the Nordic Sea, for a Nordic maritime response force, for an amphibious unit 
developing its own Arctic expertise, and even a Nordic declaration of solidarity in the 
face of external attack.47 
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 The option of having more NATO cooperation in the Arctic is certainly appealing to the 
Nordic countries, but they also realize that Russia views this as a threat to its 
sovereignty. Russia has already voiced its displeasure with NATO operations in the 
region. For example, the NATO exercise Cold Response, which takes place in northern 
Norway and includes 16,000 troops from 16 different countries,48 is seen by Russia as a 
clear provocation. Russia has argued that this exercise is a united and coordinated 
policy of barring Russia from the riches of the shelf, and says that this increase in NATO 
activity could erode constructive cooperation between the Arctic states.49 For the sake of 
avoiding damage to ties with Russia and the other Arctic nations, perhaps the Nordic 
countries should aim to focus on a grouping less oriented with NATO. After all, Russia 
would much rather see Sweden and Finland join a Nordic alliance than join NATO. 
 The North American Arctic powers have been much more quiet about the role NATO 
should play in the region. Although it did mention NATO in its Northern Strategy, Canada 
has given very few details about what role the Alliance would play in its Arctic policy. 
Canada seems to be more focused on unilateral security, as well as regional 
cooperation with the United States and Denmark.50 While the USA has been quite 
reserved in the Arctic up to this point, several administrations have backed NATO to 
remain a foundational pillar of Arctic security.51
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The Arctic Council
 The Arctic Council was created under the terms of a ministerial declaration signed in 
Ottawa, Canada, on 19 September 1996. It describes itself as a “high level forum” that is 
intended to promote “cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic 
States.”52 The Council has found a useful niche as a producer of scientific assessments 
and as a platform for the Arctic’s indigenous people to voice their concerns. The Arctic 
Council has also been used as a mechanism for international initiatives such as an 
agreement signed in May 2011 that addressed search and rescue in the Arctic.53 
 The Council is made up of eight permanent members- United States, Russia, Canada, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. There are also six indigenous 
organizations that are permanent members of the council- The Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Aleut International Association, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, Russia Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. 
Moreover, there are also twelve non-Arctic states, nine intergovernmental and inter-
parliamentary, and eleven non-governmental organizations that have been granted 
observer status.54 This provides a very balanced platform of multilateral discussion, 
where parties from all spectrums of Arctic interests get to have their say in matters. The 
effectiveness of the Arctic Council has exceeded the expectations of many, but as a high 
level forum its powers remain limited. 
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 Chapter 2: Benefits of a more accessible Arctic
 While resource extraction and shipping in the Arctic remain costly due to a lack of 
infrastructure, remoteness of the area and harshness of the climate, it still remains 
inevitable that these activities will become more frequent in the future.55 This chapter will 
cover how oil, gas, and mining operations will lead to an increase in destination 
shipping, while an acceleration of the ice-melt rate will lead to an increase in transit 
shipping.
2.1: Oil and gas development
  In a world that has become increasingly dependent on hydrocarbons to quench its 
energy thirst, it should be of no surprise to anyone that the Arctic has become the 
newest frontier of oil and gas exploration. The more it is studied, the more apparent the 
Arctic’s potential resource wealth becomes. The most referenced study to date is the 
2008 US Geological Survey, which estimated that the Arctic region contained 
approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 47,261 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and 44 
billion barrels of natural gas liquids.56        
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Some have estimated that this area accounts for an astounding 25 percent of the world’s 
remaining oil and gas reserves.57 By comparison, the reserves of Kuwait contain 90 
billion barrels of oil, and Iraq has approximately 135 billion barrels. 
 These statistics have made the Arctic very appealing to the biggest oil companies from 
around the globe. Many of these companies have flocked to the Canadian Arctic and 
obtained exploratory licenses for offshore Arctic drilling. Some of these successful 
bidders include Chevron (US$103,300,000) in 2009-2010, BP (US$1.18 million) in 2008 
and Imperial Oil (US$585,000,000) in 2007.58 The first application to drill a deep water 
well in Canadian Arctic waters is expected to come sometime between 2014 and 2015,59 
an indication that the region could see some hydrocarbon extraction in the not-so-distant 
future. 
 Canada looks to have the biggest growth potential in natural gas extraction in the 
coming years, with 11 out of the 15 undeveloped natural gas fields in the Arctic Circle in 
the Canadian Northwest Territories.60 As always with Canadian Arctic projects the issue 
is a lack of an effective infrastructure to enable development. However, this is beginning 
to change. For example, the Canadian federal government has recently given approval 
to the Mackenzie Gas Project, which has the goal of developing natural gas fields in the 
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Mackenzie Delta in the Northwest Territories and to deliver the natural gas to markets 
through a 1,196 kilometer pipeline system built along the Mackenzie Valley.61 
 
Figure 3: Map of Mackenzie Delta Project plans. Source: http://www.mackenziegasproject.com/
theProject/index.html
2.2: Mining operations  
 Mining operations are also beginning to pick up in the Canadian Arctic. Mining firms are 
exploring for iron, gold, lead, zinc, nickel, uranium, and diamonds. Recent development 
projects in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories have made Canada the third-largest 
diamond producer in the world behind Botswana and Russia, with $2.4 billion worth in 
2008 alone.62 Massive nickel discoveries have been discovered in several regions, 
including Paulatuk, which sits on the Northwest Passage shore. Also, the Mary River 
mine on Baffin Island is projected to extract about 205 million tons of iron deposits.63 
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Altogether, between 2005 and 2008, mineral exploration and appraisal investments rose 
by 117 percent in the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.64
2.3: Alternative energy  
  A particular development in the Arctic is the discovery of another type of hydrocarbon 
called methane hydrate. Basically, it is methane that is trapped in ice-like water 
structures under great pressure or at low temperatures, and is most abundant in Arctic 
permafrost. This hydrocarbon was discovered naturally in the 1960’s by Soviet 
scientists, and now Japanese and Canadian scientists are studying the possibility of 
methane hydrate production in the Mackenzie Valley. It is becoming more evident that 
this could be a very plentiful energy source, as estimates of methane hydrates in the 
Alaskan North Slope range from 3,200,000 billion cubic meters to 19,000,000 billion 
cubic meters.65 However, while methane hydrate seems like an attractive form of 
unconventional gas, it is almost twenty times more potent of a greenhouse gas than 
carbon dioxide.66 Production of this hydrocarbon on a large scale would thus pose 
serious risks to the environment. 
 There is also significant potential for other forms of energy. The Arctic sea has some of 
the strongest tides in the world and could be highly effective in producing hydropower. 
Furthermore, its landscape holds spectacular potential for geothermal energy, and 




Iceland has already taken advantage of this through its geothermal-powered aluminum 
smelting industry.67 
2.4: The Northwest Passage as a viable shipping route
 An open Northwest Passage presents considerable international shipping benefits. A 
journey from Rotterdam, Netherlands to Yokohama, Japan is 23,470 kilometres through 
the Panama Canal, yet through the Northwest Passage it is only 13,950 kilometres.68 
This obviously means that there is a potential to make huge savings on fuel and crew 
costs for shipping companies, as well as drastically shortening delivery times. While it is 
still being debated whether or not the Passage is suitable for larger commercial vessels, 
underwater mapping done by the CCGS Amundsen in 2003 suggests that even today an 
experienced navigator could take a large container ship or tanker through the passage in 
late summer or early fall.69 
 In addition to the fact that it is a much shorter journey than the traditional routes from 
Europe to Asia, the Northwest Passage is an attractive option due to the stability of the 
countries surrounding it, meaning there are fewer security risks for vessels transiting 
through. The Suez and Panama canals are located in areas of considerable political 
instability and are vulnerable to terrorism and piracy. These canals will also require 
major capacity upgrades in the near future.70 Meanwhile, the governments surrounding 
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the Arctic have stable economies and, perhaps with the exception of Russia, stable 
democratic governments that are easy to do business with. The relatively cooperative 
manner in which these countries have settled boundary disputes in the region is a good 
indication of the lack of security risk in the Arctic.71  
 With climate change causing a gradual decline in Arctic ice volume, it seems that a 
shortcut through the legendary Northwest Passage is beginning to become more of a 
reality. In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment reported that average extent of 
sea-ice cover had declined by 15%-20% over the previous thirty years. The remaining 
ice was 10%-20% thinner overall, even 40% thinner in some areas.72 What’s more is 
that much of the remaining ice is younger, and younger ice tends to melt much faster 
than older multi-year ice. This means that Arctic ice will decline at a more rapid pace as 
the years go by.73 Figure 3 shows the projected September ice levels until 2090 
according to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report. One can clearly see that the 
Northwest Passage will become more ice-free in the future.     
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Figure 4: Projected Arctic ice levels in September through 2090. Source:http://www.amap.no/documents/
doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786
  While international shipping companies still remain wary of traversing the Northwest 
Passage, there is a projected increase in destination shipping in the coming years. As 
the Passage becomes more open and the areas surrounding its shores become more 
developed, destination shipping will be needed more frequently for community re-supply, 
marine tourism, and resource extraction.74 After all, due to a lack of any reliable land 
route from the Canadian Arctic territories to the Canadian provinces, a sea route is 
simply the only option to ship goods from point A to B. Seeing how the Canadian 
government has shown no real intent on creating a viable North-South land transit route 
in the near future, it seems that shipping activity in Arctic waters will continue to 
increase.75 
  As far as shipping infrastructure is concerned, Canada still has some work to do. 
Canada’s only Arctic deepwater seaport is located in Churchill, Manitoba. The Churchill 
Port sits on the west coast of Hudson Bay and is directly connected to the Canadian 
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railway system. As shipping operations increase in the Canadian and American Arctic, 
the Churchill Port is being touted as the North American terminal for transarctic trade.76 
The Canadian government also announced plans to refurbish an existing deepwater port 
in Nanisivik on the Northwest Passage for military and civilian purposes, and it will be 
operational by 2015.77
 A good example of Canada’s strong ambitions for destination shipping in the Arctic is 
the Baffinland iron ore project that started in 2012. Iron ore from the open pit mine is 
taken by truck to a port, where it is then taken by freighters that can carry 200,000 metric 
tons each. It is estimated that 18 to 20 million tons of iron ore per year are being 
transported from this project. The shipping is being handled by Canadian company 
Fednav, who has ordered the purchase of seven more carriers from a Korean shipyard. 
Most significantly, these vessels are capable of operating year round, and will be able to 
travel to Europe through ice as thick as 1.7 metres in 10 to 12 days during the winter.78 
This is evidence that shipping in the Canadian Arctic is becoming more possible as 
shipping technology continues to improve.
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Figure 5: Chart of various shipping route distances. Source- Danish Institute for International Studies.
  It is not just Canada and the other Arctic nations who are interested in sending 
shipments through the increasingly ice-free Arctic. Many other nations south of the Arctic 
Circle have also shown a strong interest in using these new routes. One telling sign of 
this is the spike in attendance at the annual Arctic Shipping North America conference. 
Between 2010 and 2011, there was a 20% increase of participants,79 showing that more 
countries and corporations intend to throw their hats into the ring. However, non-Arctic 
nations are not as interested in using the Northwest Passage for destination shipping as 
they are for international shipping. Countries that are especially dependent on exports 
and imports - Japan, China, South Korea etc. - are showing the most interest in the 
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Northwest Passage option.80 China in particular is always looking to reduce shipping 
distances and is investing money in over a hundred oil projects around the world. 
Therefore, China sees itself as one of the biggest beneficiaries of a more open and 
accessible Arctic. The European Union has also expressed interest in the Arctic, 
specifically focusing on the abundance of resources as it continues to search for new 
ways to feed its ever increasing energy dependence.81 
  
2.5: Advancements in Arctic shipping technology
  The most underlying problem with shipping through the Arctic is ice. Even during the 
summer months, vessels need to be strong enough to resist being battered by ice 
patches and icebergs. The Soviets were the first to make significant strides in making 
year round transit through the Arctic a possibility when they completed the construction 
of the Arktika in 1977. At the time it was the most powerful icebreaker ever built, and it 
was the first surface ship to ever reach the North Pole. While the ship was expensive to 
make and slow moving, it was immensely powerful and made people realize that Arctic 
shipping was a possibility.82 
 Even today, the high cost and slow movement of Arctic shipping remains a big turnoff 
for those looking to traverse the Passage, but advances in Arctic shipping technology 
are beginning to change that. Finland has taken the lead in building effective ice-capable 
ships. While that country does not hold any Arctic coastline, all of its ports have do deal 
with ice during the winter months, as the shallow and relatively unsalty waters of the 
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Baltic freeze quite easily. It is therefore perhaps not surprising the Finnish firm Aker 
Arctic is involved in the construction of 60 percent of the world’s icebreakers.83 While the 
company does not actually build ships, it acts as a design and blue printing company 
and has advanced testing facilities in Vuosaari, Finland where they can simulate various 
ice conditions in order to see how different vessel models hold up. Aker Arctic’s goal is to 
create transport ships that can handle ice conditions and then travel open waters without 
the conventional sluggish icebreaker support. The central innovation to their approach is 
a propulsion system that allows the ships to run astern (backwards) through the ice, and 
then turn around and go at a more efficient speed while in open waters. Russian mining 
company Norilsk Nickel has purchased five of these ships and is saving an estimated 
$100 million a year by using them. Aker has also designed transpolar container ships for 
Russia’s largest oil and gas companies: Lukoil and Gazprom. These ships weigh 70,000 
tons and the company claims they would be able to sail across the Arctic even in the 
kind of ice conditions that will continue to exist in parts of the Arctic long after ice-free 
summers have become a regular occurrence.84
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2.6: The Northwest Passage as Canadian controlled waters
 The Canadian government sees great political and economic importance in being able 
to control the Northwest Passage. If the Passage is classified as Canadian internal 
waters, Canada would have unlimited rights to restrict other nations vessels that enter.85  
Most importantly, having full sovereignty over the Northwest Passage would ensure that 
Canada has full control over its Arctic security. Ships passing through the Passage are 
no doubt passing by Canadian shores, and it is therefore in Canada’s best interest to be 
able to control and regulate who and what is being shipped through these waters. For 
example, the current “agree to disagree” mentality between Canada, the United States, 
and the rest of the world regarding sovereignty over the Passage makes it difficult to 
determine who would be responsible for regulating the cargo of ships traveling through. 
An international agreement recognizing Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest 
Passage would make it possible for there to be clearly laid out laws and regulations for 
vessels traveling through. On the other hand, a more affordable and arguably more 
effective method of managing the Passage would be for Canada to regard it as an 
international strait and lead a multilateral regime to regulate development, operations, 
and security. These matters will be examined more closely in Chapter 5.           
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Chapter 3: Challenges to Developing a More Open Arctic
 While the prospects of a more accessible Arctic seem lucrative on the surface, the 
reality is there are many obstacles in the way of significantly taking advantage of it...and 
the Northwest Passage is no exception. Many factors, including environmental risks, 
indigenous people, lack of infrastructure, lack of technology, security and sovereignty 
issues make Canada’s Arctic ambitions difficult to achieve. This chapter will analyze and 
break down these factors in an attempt to better understand the true complexity of the 
situation. 
3.1: Environmental risks
 The Arctic is one of the most fragile ecosystems in the world. Michael Byers gives a 
telling description of exactly how fragile it is:
 Arctic species have features and life cycles that reflect an adaptation to life on and under the sea-ice. 
Unique forms of algae and bacteria are active below and in cracks between the sea-ice at temperatures 
as low as eight degrees below zero (Fahrenheit). They are fed upon by miniature crustacean which, in 
turn, are consumed by Arctic cod, a species of fish that is able to synthesize antifreeze proteins in its 
blood. The cod are in turn preyed upon by ringed seals, which give birth and nurse their pups in dens 
inside sea-ice ridges. The seals then provide the main food source for two dominant predators: polar 
bears and the Inuit, both of which are perfectly adapted to find and kill seals in the whiteness of the pack 
ice. The shortness of the food chain, the remarkable specialization involved, and the near total reliance on 
a precarious ice-water balance measured in fractions of a degree of temperature all combine to make the 
Arctic marine ecosystem almost uniquely susceptible to disruption and destruction.86
 This makes development of the region very risky- particularly when it comes to oil and 
gas. An oil or gas spill would have a devastating effect on the marine environment, 
especially to the food chain and to marine organisms. Some effects would include death, 
the disruption of mating behaviour, coating of animals with oil, the ingestion of oil, and 
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the alteration of habitat.87 While any ecosystem would be harmed by an oil spill, the fact 
that the Arctic has fewer living organisms makes it much harder for them to recover in 
comparison. Moreover, the Arctic is already going through accelerated climate change 
and can ill afford any more alterations to its environment.88 Additionally, large ships 
moving through and emptying their ballast tanks as they enter more shallow waters 
could introduce destructive foreign parasites or poisonous algae, causing widespread 
damage. Increased shipping can also disturb mating, birthing, or nursing of whales in the 
Northwest Passage.89 
 Many experts think that an oil spill in the Arctic is highly likely. For example, US Arctic 
Research Commission chair George B. Newton said: “With easier access and increased 
shipping, and on and offshore exploitation of fuel resources, the concern for an oil spill in 
high latitude, ice-infested waters becomes very real. It is an event the world is ill-
prepared to face.”90 With 982 spills of at least 10,000 gallons of oil in high-traffic areas 
since 1960, Newton suggests that it is a statistic likelihood that a major oil spill will 
eventually happen in the Arctic.91
 An oil spill in the Arctic would be incredibly difficult to clean up. The separation of oil 
from ice on a large scale is highly problematic. It is energetically very intense because 
the oil will slip into the brine drainage channels and can only be removed by melting the 
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ice, a process that no one has been able to prove is possible on a large scale.92 The 
World Wildlife Fund has also pointed out that the same environmental conditions that 
contribute to oil spill risks also make clean up response operations extremely difficult. 
These conditions include the lack of natural light, extreme cold, moving ice floes, high 
winds and low visibility.93 It has been estimated by the National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling that the Arctic temperature alone 
would prevent containment responses up to 50-64% of the time in the winter months.94 
Another factor that would greatly hinder cleanup response efforts is the remoteness of 
the Arctic. The Northwest Passage in particular is far away from the more populated 
areas of North America and it would take a substantial amount of time to get man-power 
and equipment to the spill site.95 Infrastructure and fast response time were both critical 
factors in cleaning up the BP oil spill in the Mexican gulf, and it was still a huge disaster 
with devastating effects that will last for years to come. Therefore, one can probably 
assume that a spill in the Arctic, considering all factors mentioned above, would be just 
as devastating or worse.   
  Oil and gas extraction can cause environmental harm even if it doesn’t result in a spill. 
The use of power generation equipment, supply activities, and shuttle transportation can 
all contribute to air pollution. Also, the installation of equipment on the sea floor can 
negatively impact the surrounding flora and fauna, as well as fish and other water-
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dwelling species in the area.96 Moreover, the relatively short drilling season in the Arctic 
makes it difficult to drill ‘same season relief wells’ (SSRW). In seasonal areas such as 
the Arctic, companies looking to drill in Canadian Arctic waters are required to 
demonstrate that they have the capacity to drill a relief well fast enough to stop a blow-
out before the drilling season ends. The purpose is to prevent the blow-out from 
continuing through the off season until the company is able to return the next year. 
However, oil companies like Imperial Oil and BP have complained that it would take at 
least two years to drill a relief well in Arctic waters, and are pressuring the Canadian 
government to lift this requirement. But this would be a risky move by the government, 
because the chances of blow-outs is higher in the Arctic due to difficulties such as cold 
and human fatigue, harsh climate impacts on equipment, and the lack of research and 
exploration in the area.97
  According to oil industry representatives, oil exploration in the Arctic is not likely to 
increase at any substantial rate within the next 10 years,98 largely due to the problems 
mentioned above. This means that there is still time to ensure that development in the 
Arctic can be moved forward without having an adverse impact on the environment. 
Therefore, Canada should be actively seeking partners in industry and the circumpolar 
world in pollution response. While there are currently agreements with the US and 
Denmark, they are regionally limited and need to be expanded. For example, the 
Canada-US Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan only covers the Beaufort Sea and 
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is indifferent on which state commits specific resources. Efforts need to be made to form 
an agreement between Canada, the United States, and Denmark to create a common 
stockpile of emergency response equipment and a shared infrastructure in order to 
protect the entire North American Arctic. This agreement should include joint training, 
plans, doctrine, and procedure between the three respective national coast guards. 
Finally, these governments should work with industry leaders in order to determine the 
best methods of alleviating the risk of oil spills and other forms of pollution.99   
3.2: Indigenous people
  Going hand in hand with the environmental risks of oil and gas development in the 
Canadian Arctic is the fact that most of it will take place within the territorial waters of 
Indigenous people. Maps of areas where exploration licences have been given in the 
Beaufort Sea show that many of the areas are within close proximity to the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Lands. In the Eastern part of the Canadian Arctic, the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement covers much of the land bordering the Arctic Ocean.100 
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Figure 6: Map of indigenous territories in the Canadian Arctic Circle. Source: Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada. Link: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/Map/irs/mp/mp-eng.asp.
 It is therefore fair to say that the risk of suffering from environmental harm is far higher 
for the Indigenous communities than non-Indigenous communities. Many of these 
Indigenous communities inhabit territories that extend up into the Arctic sea ice and, due 
to their spiritual relationship with the land, rely more heavily on resources drawn from 
their territories than non-Indigenous people. For these aforementioned reasons, 
Indigenous communities are highly susceptible to environmental harm. Climate change 
has already resulted in a lack of access to resources crucial to survival, and air and 
water pollution can also be highly problematic for these communities.101 Increased 
shipping through Canadian Arctic waters also pose a threat to Indigenous people 
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because these waters are home to beluga whales, ringed seals, and walrus- all of which 
these people rely upon for food. The Inuit are especially a maritime people, with all but 
one of their communities in the Nunavut Territories located on the seacoast.102 
 One could argue that Indigenous communities could financially benefit from oil and gas 
development in their regions, but the truth is that more often than not they see little 
profit. For example, offshore oil and gas development operations usually need to bring in 
staff with specialized skill sets, which leaves Indigenous people at a considerable 
disadvantage. What usually ends up happening is that Indigenous people fill the 
hospitality and service jobs, as well as the unskilled jobs associated with oil and gas 
development, while non-Indigenous people fill the high paying jobs.103
 What’s more is Indigenous communities have to live with the consequential pollution 
from oil and gas operations long after they are finished. Offshore oil and gas 
development operations typically last for 20-50 years, and once they are completed 
most of the non-Indigenous people will leave. Most of the towns that are set up to 
support the developments will be abandoned as well. Therefore the remaining social and 
environmental problems are likely to be left with the Indigenous communities left 
behind.104 
 Because oil and gas development will have an overwhelmingly disproportionate impact 
on Indigenous communities, the Canadian government has an obligation to consult with 
them and listen to their concerns before any operations are started in their territories. In 
fact, Canada’s Indigenous Arctic communities actually have a strong constitutional claim 
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for protection of their Aboriginal fishing, harvesting, and hunting rights- all of which would 
be infringed upon by oil and gas operations in their waters.105 In the recent Supreme 
Court of Canada case of Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the 
Supreme Court confirmed that the Government of Canada has a duty to consult 
Aboriginal groups before exploiting lands on which they have claims to: 
Balance and compromise are inherent in the notion of reconciliation. Where accommodation is required in 
making decisions that may adversely affect as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims, the Crown 
must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on the asserted 
right or title and with other societal interests.106
 Another important factor behind the Government of Canada’s obligation to consult with 
its Arctic Indigenous communities is that they are actually a crucial part of Canada’s 
sovereignty claims over the waters in its Arctic Archipelago. The economic and cultural 
dependence of the Inuit on sea ice is emphasized in the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement as a significant supporting argument for Canadian sovereignty in the 
archipelago waters.107 It could actually be argued that the Canadian government created 
the relatively autonomous territory of Nunavut in 1999 in order to use its Indigenous 
inhabitants as a bastion to its territorial claims, rather than for the publicly declared 
social justice oriented reasoning.108
 Indigenous communities do not have to be seen as an obstacle to Arctic development, 
but the Canadian government needs to ensure that their needs are accommodated in 
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order to avoid the worst case scenario of a humanitarian crisis. The Canadian 
government has already come under heavy criticism for its treatment of Indigenous 
communities around the Alberta tar sands, as more evidence continues to surface that 
indicates oil development operations are causing increases in cancer and other serious 
diseases in the communities.109 Similar occurrences in Canada’s Arctic would likely have 
devastating effects, as these Indigenous communities are small and often very far away 
from medical centres. 
   3.3: Lack of infrastructure
 While the Government of Canada continues with its “use it or lose it” rhetoric towards 
Arctic development, the truth is that there is still plenty of work to be done before they 
can even begin to bare the economic fruits of the Arctic. This is mainly due to the fact 
that there is a substantial lack of infrastructure for any industry to be successful in this 
remote region. The most apparent reason for this is the fact that the vast majority of the 
Canadian population lives much further south, relatively close to the U.S. border, and 
there has never been a real need to develop an area so far away from civilization in a 
country that already has a small population size to land-mass ratio. Moreover, the 
extreme weather and general mysteriousness of the Canadian Arctic has historically 
made any development there seem undesirable, if not impossible. But now that climate 
change is making the area more accessible and studies are showing an abundance of 
resources, development seems more desirable. However, the problem of a lack of 
infrastructure still remains.
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 The problem with developing an infrastructure in the Arctic is that it is tremendously 
expensive, and one reason for this is the geography. Permafrost creates big problems 
for construction because of thawing underneath structures and roads. There are ways 
around this, the most common one being a special foundation built above ground so that 
the building’s warmth doesn’t melt the permafrost underneath, but it is quite costly. There 
is also the issue of coastal erosion. This is a result of the stronger waves that are 
occurring at an accelerated rate due to diminishing sea ice. This erosion damages port 
infrastructure and increases the rate of permafrost melt. The effects of coastal erosion 
can be mitigated by various methods of strengthening the shoreline, but they are also 
expensive tasks.110
 Many other construction challenges also make development more expensive. 
Construction materials and equipment are usually not readily available when they are 
needed and they often need to be shipped long distances during the brief summer 
window in order to reach a job site. Not only can this cause lengthy delays, the cost of 
transport is often more expensive than the cost of buying the material or equipment.111 
Finding skilled labour for a job is another issue that drives up costs of development 
projects. Nearby villages can provide some labour, but skilled construction labour usually 
needs to be imported from other locations. One labour issue cited by industry experts is 
how many in the local labour force have to hunt or do other duties during the summer 
seasons in order to prepare for the winter. Bringing in outside workers consequently 
means that temporary camps need to be built, resulting in more additional costs. Finally, 
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the short construction season means that most types of construction can only take place 
within a window of four months.112
3.4: Barriers to developing the Northwest Passage as a shipping route
 While the prospect of longer ice-free seasons in the Northwest Passage and its shortcut 
from Europe to Asia may seem like a mouth watering prospect for shipping companies, 
the truth is that many of them are still wary about using it. This is because underneath 
the surface, there are still many complications that remain. 
 On the surface, less ice in the Passage seems like it will make it easy for vessels to 
traverse through. However, scientists differ on whether or not this is in fact the case. The 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment thinks that the opposite is true: 
 Results of research at Canada’s Institute of Ocean Sciences suggest that the amount of multi-year sea 
ice moving into the Northwest Passage is controlled by blockages or “ice bridges” in the northern channels 
and straits of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. With a warmer arctic climate leading to higher 
temperatures and a longer melt season, these bridges are likely to be more easily weakened (and likely to 
be maintained for a shorter period of time each winter) and the flushing or movement of ice through the 
channels and straits could become more frequent. More multi-year ice and potentially many more icebergs 
could thus move into the marine routes of the Northwest Passage, presenting additional hazards to 
navigation.113
 The Canadian Ice Service has predicted yearly variability in sea-ice conditions, even if 
the Arctic region as a whole experiences an overall reduction in sea-ice.114 Other 
scientists believe that as the Arctic Ocean icepack moves north, less multi-year ice will 
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make its way into the Northwest Passage.115 Clearly there is much disagreement on ice 
conditions in the Passage for the near future, but nearly all scientists agree that it will be 
fully navigable for part of the year by 2050.116 No matter which scientists they choose to 
believe, it seems that the Canadian government is attempting to prepare for the eventual 
point when the Northwest Passage is safely navigable.
 The short term problem the Canadian government needs to address in order to 
encourage more shipping activity is the sporadic and unpredictable patterns of ice. 
Winds and currents are constantly shifting ice into channels which were clear only a 
matter of days or weeks before.117 The most dangerous ice in these channels is multi-
year ice chunks. While usually only about a meter large, they still weigh more than a 
metric ton. They are extremely hard and barely float above the surface, making them 
very difficult for ships to detect. If a ship hits one at full speed it could be devastating. 
For example, in 2007 the cruise ship MS Explorer sank in Antarctica after hitting one, 
even though it had an ice-strengthened hull.118 Without proper monitoring of these ice 
chunks, even ice-strengthened ships will have to slow down when traversing the 
Northwest Passage, consequently reducing the value of a shortcut through the Arctic. 
 In order to curtail this problem, Canada needs to upgrade its ice reporting systems. 
While the current system has worked relatively well over the past three decades, it is 
predicated on relatively consistent ice conditions and is not effective at taking year to 
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year variation into consideration. Seeing how year to year ice conditions are becoming 
more and more unpredictable, this could become a problem when more ships begin to 
travel through the Northwest Passage. An investigation by the Canadian Hydraulics 
Centre testing the efficiency of the current ice reporting system found that the system 
often allows vessels into potentially dangerous areas while also restricting ships from 
entering regions with favourable conditions.119 Other experts have also expressed 
concerns about the system, saying it needs to be expanded to consider factors like 
speed, visibility, and the experience of the ice navigator.120 One example of what can 
happen with an ineffective ice reporting system was a collision in 2010 of two oil tankers 
in the Russian Arctic. Two tankers owned by Murmansk Shipping Company collided due 
to difficult ice conditions that was compounded by poor visibility. While the vessels did 
not sink, the hulls were damaged and there was a real risk of the 13,300 tons of diesel 
on board spilling into the ocean.121 Had there been a more adequate ice reporting 
system in place, it is arguable that this near disaster would never have happened. 
 Other technology such as radio and radar beacons, lighted marks, radar reflectors and 
various buoys are also needed to mark off safe passages. Canada should model its 
plans after the Northern Sea Route, which deploys radio beacons in 47 locations, 
seventeen of which are manned stations. 200 radar reflectors are also placed along its 
coast because the low surrounding islands make radar navigation difficult. The Northern 
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Sea Route also has 250 lighted marks and 200 unlit marks, as well as 1,000 floating 
marks added during the summer.122 While the Canadian Coast Guard maintains a 
number of fixed and floating aids, it still has a lot more work to do in this area if it intends 
to make the Northwest Passage a legitimate shipping route.
 In order to reduce ships being grounded in the Northwest Passage, Canada needs to 
increase its hydrographic mapping efforts. As of 2012, only 10% of the total Arctic 
maritime area has been mapped to modern standards, and has consequently resulted in 
several groundings. This includes the grounding of a tanker carrying nine million litres of 
fuel in 2010 off the coast of Nunavut.123
 The Arctic sea ice does not only pose a physical threat to vessels, it will also result in 
extremely high insurance costs. While it is unknown how high insurance premiums 
would be for journeys through the Canadian Arctic, it has been estimated that they would 
cost anywhere between 150% to 300% higher than journeys through blue water.124 
These sky-high insurance premiums actually indicate that the dangers and liabilities of 
an Arctic transit means that costs would exceed the savings made by taking the 
Northwest Passage shortcut on a journey from Japan to New York.125 This is yet another 
reason why Canada needs to upgrade its infrastructure in and around the Northwest 
Passage. The more effort that is put in to make it is a safe and reliable route, the more 
insurance premiums will decline. 
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 When looking at the Northwest Passage as a feasible shipping route, one must realize 
that the cornerstone of container shipping is just-in-time delivery. It is not good enough 
for shipping companies to go from point A to B without a deadline to meet. These firms 
have strict timetables, and if the goods are late they will be subjected to heavy penalties 
and damaged credibility.126 Another problem is that shipping timetables need to be made 
and published well in advance, and if the route is only available for a few months of the 
year it makes it difficult to plan exactly when to use which route- especially when 
considering the unpredictable yearly ice patterns. If a strait is not open by the time a ship  
is scheduled to transit through it, it then creates a big dilemma for the shipping company. 
Moreover, most container shippers include several stopovers in their routes in order to 
maximize profit. For example on the route between the Mediterranean and eastern Asia, 
shipping company CMA-CGM stops over in Damietta (Egypt), Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), 
and Djibouti. In the Arctic there are very few ports, including only one in Canada 
(Churchill),127 which means that there is far less profit to be made by going through the 
Northwest Passage in comparison to the canals and straits further south. 
 It is therefore not surprising that surveys conducted with shipping firms from around the 
globe have found that most are still skeptical of using Arctic routes like the Northwest 
Passage. A survey conducted by Frederic Lasserre found that only 17 out of 98 firms 
answered that they were interested in using Arctic routes. However, shipping firms with a 
stake in bulk transportation - what is usually used for resource exploitation - seem more 
keen on exploring their options.128 Another survey done by the United States 
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Government Accountability Office found that bulk shipping companies are more 
interested in the Northern Sea Route, because it has been transited more and there is 
relatively less sea ice.129
 While Arctic routes will probably never be able to compete with the Panama or Suez 
canals for international shipping, the fact remains that destination shipping will 
experience substantial growth through the coming years in the region. As resource 
exploitation picks up in the Canadian Arctic, so will the need to make the Northwest 
Passage as safe as possible in order to benefit the economy and protect the 
environment. Most importantly the issue over sovereignty in the Passage needs to be 
settled in order to make sure that ships entering these waters know what laws and 
regulations they are to follow. 
3.5: Security and surveillance in the Northwest Passage
  If Canada truly wants to control the Northwest Passage, it needs to be able to 
effectively patrol it. Arctic stakeholders have heavily criticized Canada’s deteriorating 
Coast Guard fleet and its aging 11 ships, as well as its CAD$55 million funding gap. Its 
icebreaking fleet consists of two heavy icebreakers, four medium icebreakers, one light 
icebreaker, one research icebreaker, and three river class ships.130 While a useful 
icebreaker lifespan is typically 30 years, the current planned replacement schedules will 
be replacing vessels 40-48 years old. Despite the rising costs of breakdowns and 
maintenance, Canada’s 25-year fleet recapitalization plan is not scheduled to begin until 
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2017. The government plans to replace the 11 aging vessels and add five new ones, but 
critics are arguing that these new ships will not be adequate for effectively patrolling the 
Arctic.131 
 What Canada needs is more heavy icebreakers. There are currently only two, and 
neither are capable of operating year-round. While the 2008 federal budget promised to 
replace one of the vessels with the $720 million Diefenbaker, this will take at least eight 
years and will not improve the coast guard’s capabilities.132 If Canada wants a model of 
what an effective fleet of icebreakers can do, they need to look at Russia. To assist 
traffic through the Northern Sea Route, Russia deploys seven nuclear powered 
icebreakers and several strong diesel powered craft. While Canada’s planned Offshore 
Patrol Craft will be valuable additions to search and rescue and law enforcement, they 
will not provide the capabilities needed to escort and rescue vehicles trapped in the 
ice.133 
 In order to assert full sovereignty in the Arctic, Canada would need to be able to patrol 
the Northwest Passage year-round. This can only be possible with an icebreaker of 
Polar 8 strength. While the Harper government has acknowledged this need, budgetary 
restraints have resulted in the planned construction of the three-season John G. 
Diefenbaker ship.134 While this is a step forward, it is not nearly enough to fully patrol the 
vast Canadian Arctic. 
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  Canada also needs to step up surveillance in the region. Traditionally, Canada has 
relied on its small fleet of CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft. One idea for more efficiency 
could be to use unmanned drones in the region. Drone technology is rapidly improving 
and many, like the Predator drone, are able to fly for 40 hours with a range of 3,700 km. 
New solar powered drones can stay in the air for days, or even weeks at a time. Using 
drones would save money on fuel consumption and crew costs, and would arguably be 
a more efficient method of surveilling the region.135 
 The bottom line is that in order for Canada to lay claim to the Northwest Passage, it 
needs to prove that it has the ability to control the region on which it is laying claim. 
While Canada does not stem to benefit financially from the Northwest Passage in the 
near future, it needs to decide how much it wants to invest in the long term. This is a 
tricky predicament, and the decision needs to be made soon considering Canada’s 
aging icebreaker fleet and lack of Arctic infrastructure combined with the rapidly growing 
international interest in developing the Arctic. 
 While the Stephen Harper government has built on its predecessors strong rhetoric 
regarding the Arctic, it has yet to prove it is doing more than just blowing hot air. 
Moreover, if it is not ready to make the investment, it needs to look for other options. The 
Canadian government could use private investments to assert Canadian sovereignty for 
example, but the best option would be to back off from its aggressive approach and 
return to its traditional liberal internationalist foreign policy that has worked so well in the 
past.    
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Chapter 4: Three theoretical perspectives of Canadian foreign policy
 There are three dominant theoretical perspectives of Canadian foreign policy: peripheral 
dependency, liberal internationalism, and complex neorealism. All three of these theories 
have seemed to many, at one point or another, to be the most credible description of the 
nature of how Canada conducts itself in the international political arena. This chapter will 
break down these theoretical perspectives and will argue that the Stephen Harper 
government has moved away from Canada’s longstanding liberal internationalist foreign 
policy and towards a complex neoliberal approach. 
4.1: Peripheral dependency 
 The peripheral dependency theory according to Dewitt and Kirton regards Canada’s 
global ranking as a “small, penetrated power within the international hierarchy.”136 This 
theory asserts that Canada has been increasingly dominated both culturally and 
economically by the United States ever since it received control over its own foreign 
policy from Britain. Being a small, penetrated power, Canada has a “degree of 
international activity characterized by low interaction with the outside world and the 
virtual absence of independent, direct contacts in world politics.137 
  A peripherally dependent country’s foreign policy is almost always the same as the 
controlling state, which in Canada’s case would be the United States. Kirton argues that 
this makes Canada’s foreign policy very predictable.138 This theory also concludes that 
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Canada’s international trajectory is on a perpetual decline, as the country becomes 
increasingly more dependent on the United States.139  
  There are several critical problems with the Canadian peripheral dependency theory. 
Appel Molot argues that this theory does not allow for the possibility of change in status 
over time.140 But the biggest problem with this theory is that its supporters rely too much 
on Canada’s relationship with the United States, while seeming to cognitively ignore 
Canada’s relations with other countries, as well as the significant role it plays in 
international organizations.141 
 One specific relatively recent example especially goes against this theory. The instance 
was Canada’s decision to follow international law by declining to join the Iraq war in 
2003 without the United Nations’ approval. Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien made 
clear that his main reason for declining was Canada’s commitment to internationalism, 
saying “If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the [United Nations] 
Security Council, Canada will not participate.”142
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4.2: Liberal internationalism
 Liberal internationalism has been the dominant perspective of Canadian foreign policy 
analysts ever since the end of the Second World War, when Canada was given full 
control of its foreign policy.143 
 Lester B. Pearson is considered the chief practitioner of Canada’s liberal internationalist 
approach. While he would eventually become Canada’s Prime Minister in 1963 and 
served until 1968, he played a big role in Canadian foreign policy in the three previous 
decades through roles such as head of the Canadian delegation to the League of 
Nations, as Canada’s first ambassador to the United States in 1944, as deputy minister 
of state for External Affairs in 1946, and as secretary of state for External Affairs from 
1948 to 1957.144    
 Dewitt and Kirton regard liberal internationalism as being “less systematic theory than a 
collection of assumptions and descriptions.” 145 But what is central to liberal 
internationalism is the desire to achieve desired goals through diplomacy and 
compromise rather than through brute military power.146
 Pearson and his fellow diplomats constantly referred to Canada as a “middle power.” 
They believed that playing the role of middle power meant that Canadian diplomats 
could act as “middlemen” for the superpowers at the UN and other international 
organisations in order to obtain sponsors for compromise resolutions, to lobby in order to 
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avoid dangerous confrontation and to attempt to reduce tension among nations through 
the mechanisms of international organisations.147 
 Pearson wanted to take the most important concepts of liberalism to individuals - 
equality, freedom, and tolerance - and apply them to the international realm, in order to 
create an equality of nations. He referred to the concept of functionalism as the most 
effective method for enabling Canada as well as other middle and smaller powers had a 
voice and influence in international institutions. He thought that any nation should be 
able to freely exert influence and take action on issues that it is directly or indirectly 
affected by.148 When receiving his Nobel Peace Prize, Pearson said in his speech, “Men 
normally live together in their own national society without war or chaos. So it must be 
one day in international society. If there is to be peace, there must be compromise, 
tolerance, agreement.”149 
  For example, during the 1940’s and 50’s Pearson and his fellow diplomats argued that 
Canada needed to have needed to have a stronger voice and a seat at the table when it 
came to issues such as the management of international trade, the production and 
distribution of food, the regulation of civil aviation and the harnessing of atomic power, 
because Canada had a strong interest and comparative advantage in these matters. He 
asserted that: “membership on bodies and committees would include those, but only 
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those, who had a very real and direct interest in the work and could make a contribution 
to it.”150
 A big part of Pearsonian liberal internationalism is the ability to compromise. He 
believed that a foreign policy that was flexible and reactive was much more effective for 
middle and smaller powers than a policy that laid its principles in stone. This quote on 
the importance of a flexible foreign policy is more pertinent today than ever before:
If flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy is essential for Canada, it is unwise, then to lay down dogmatic 
priorities and postulates. This is especially true at a time of rapid and cataclysmic change, of the sudden 
emergence of international problems not even conceivable ten years before. In contemporary foreign 
policy, more than in most things, today’s wisdom can quickly become tomorrow’s folly. 151  
Along with flexibility, Pearson also advocated quiet diplomacy. This means that efforts to 
influence other countries decision making processes should use private persuasion, 
rather than public criticisms. He said that “too many public declarations and disclosures 
run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned. The more complex and 
dangerous the problem, the greater the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy.”152
 Pearson believed that world peace was achievable, and that international organizations 
were the means of achieving it. For this reason he argued that Canada should be active 
in accepting international responsibilities.153 He rejected the realist assumption that 
human nature inherently made progress towards a better world a steep task, and 
instead claimed that there was a gradual and inevitable trend towards peace through the 
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perfecting of international institutions.154 There is no question that Pearson believed that 
the United Nations was the international institution that was most capable of pushing 
forward peace and fairness among nations:
 I felt then, as I do now, that the growth of the United Nations into a truly effective world organization was 
perhaps our best, perhaps our last, hope of bringing about enduring and creative peace if mankind was to 
end a savage tradition that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. With all its 
weaknesses, which soon became clear but which, after all were only those of its member states and the 
system of international anarchy in which they had to operate, the United Nations was at least a foundation 
for a new world on which we could build.155 
 Finally, Pearson saw the idea of collective security and collective defense as crucial to 
Canadian and international security. He saw the UN peacekeeping forces (which he 
played a pivotal role in creating) and NATO as “a step in the right direction in putting 
international force behind an international decision.”156
 Critics of the liberal internationalist theory argue that its biggest flaw is that it’s too 
broad, and is too applicable to a wide range of case studies.157 But one cannot deny 
that, until recently, Canada has been following a relatively linear line of liberal 
internationalist policies. 
4.3: Complex neorealism
 The complex neorealist theory is the newest theoretical concept of Canadian foreign 
policy. Dewitt and Kirton describe how this theory “focuses on the role of hegemonic 
powers in ensuring, defining, and extending international order in a system in which 
universal values remain secondary, in which a common security calculus and interest in 
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balance provide no substitute, and in which leadership is required to transform 
convergent interests into stable order.”158 This theory sees the history of international 
relations as dominated by a succession of hegemonic powers, with very few periods of 
balance among equally powerful states. During the critical transition from a period of 
balance to a period of hegemony, order is typically defined by a number of “principle 
powers.”159 Proponents of this theory believe that we are currently going through a 
similar period, and that Canada should be regarded as a principle power.
 According to Kirton and Dewitt, three characteristics make up a principle power. First, it 
is a state that stands at the top of the international status ranking and is differentiated 
from states on the lower end of the hierarchy by both objective and subjective criteria. 
Second, it has sufficient capacity to deter significant direct assaults on its domestic 
territory, as well as a capability to provide an effective strategic presence abroad. Third, 
they have a principle role in defining and enforcing international order.
 When measuring Canada up to these characteristics, complex neorealists assert that 
the relative size, the wealth of natural resources, advanced technology, and skilled 
population place the country in the top tier of the international hierarchy. Canada’s rank 
is also supposedly reinforced by its membership in relatively exclusive international 
groups, such as the G8, that only include top ranked states. While proponents of the 
theory do not hide the fact that Canada lacks a nuclear arsenal and effective military 
deterrence, they still assert that Canada contributes militarily to strategy stability in 
several critical regions, with the most recent example being the crucial role of the 
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Canadian forces in the province of Kandahar, Afghanistan. Finally, complex neorealists 
contend that Canada plays a key role in managing global regimes in major issue 
areas.160 
 Kirton and Dewitt describe how complex neorealists believe Canada’s path to becoming 
a principle power began during the period from 1960 to 1968, when the country 
embraced globalism and used foreign aid as a means of advancing Canadian interests 
on a worldwide scale. Through doing this, Canada extended its diplomatic reach to all 
regions of the world. Then in 1968, the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
adopted a policy of exporting Canadian values in order to increase influence abroad. 
They believed that the policies of a ‘new’ Canada, such as bilingualism, ethnic relations, 
federalism, techniques of parliamentary government, income redistribution, and 
environmental protection. They believed that Canada’s small, diverse, skilled population, 
along with its extensive resource base and advanced technology gave the country a 
strong platform from which to influence and define international order.161
 This theory sees Canada as an ascending principle power since 1968, and in turn sees 
the United States as in decline since the same period. Thus Canada is amongst a global 
configuration of eight top tier powers in an increasingly non-hegemonic global order.162 
 According to Kirton and Dewitt, complex neorealists point to several signs that Canada 
is a principle power, capable of acting unilaterally. First, what liberal internationalists see 
as acts of a multilateralist attempt to preserve co-operative agreements, complex 
neorealists see as a “self-motivated effort to operate within the confines of the existing 
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system to national advantage.”163 Second, complex neorealists believe Canada often 
diverges from the international community and adopts positions on major issues that 
deviate from other traditionally associated countries. Third, complex neorealists assert 
that Canada tends to diversify its sources of information, markets, investment, and 
general political support. In doing this, Canada ensures that it does not rely on the 
imperial power (United States) and can increase its power through a diversity of other 
states that serve as a substitute for the imperial power.  
 Where complex neorealism especially differs from liberal internationalism is how it 
views the United Nations as an obsolete institutionalised pattern of international 
relations, and that it is more beneficial for Canada to embrace more restricted-
membership, task specific organizations such as la Francophonie, the Namibia Contact 
group within the Security Council, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the International Energy Agency, the London Suppliers Group on nuclear 
materials, and the Western Economic Summits held since 1975.164
 The main criticism of complex neorealism according to Kirton is that it asserts “states 
are autonomous actors, who behave according to their own interests and values through 
self constructed calculations.”165 This insinuates that a state can never negotiate 
honestly between other principle states, and thus fails to effectively explain Canada’s 
role in many international organizations, as Canada has a long history of setting aside 
national interest in the pursuit of common objectives. 
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  While there were certainly signs of a retreat from liberal internationalism during the 
1990’s, when the Conservative government made significant cuts to defense and foreign 
policy in order to pay down the federal deficit,166 But there is no doubt now that Canada 
has certainly embraced complex neorealism under the Harper government. Prime 
Minister Harper has favoured a self-interested, almost Realpolitik style of foreign policy, 
and the Arctic is no exception. Harper has gone against international opinion and the 
rule of law to claim sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. He has also gone against 
advancing the growth of the Arctic Council, and instead pursued a more exclusive forum 
known as the Arctic Five (A5). Further, rather than seeking regional or international 
cooperation in patrolling Canada’s Arctic, Harper has instead vowed to improve 
Canada’s military capabilities in the North.167 Finally, and perhaps most indicative of 
Harper’s shift to complex neorealism in the North, is his government’s refusal to work 
with the United States in the Northwest Passage. This fits in with the main component of 
the complex neorealist theory- that a principle state is able to work independent of the 
imperialist state.  
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Chapter 5: Returning to multilateralism- An effective Northwest 
Passage policy
 This chapter will insist that the complex neorealist Arctic strategy of the Harper 
government has been largely ineffective, and Canada therefore needs to once again 
embrace liberal internationalism. It will then elaborate on how Canada should pursue 
control over the Northwest Passage using a liberal internationalist foreign policy, 
concluding that an international agreement through the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is the most effective option.
5.1: Re-embracing multilateralism
 The Harper government’s loud, boorish rhetoric in the Arctic is proving to do little except 
score a few political points in the media.168 The fact is that the other Arctic states, and 
Russia in particular, are more than aware that Canada does not have anywhere near the 
capability to effectively enforce its claims of sovereignty unilaterally.169 While Lester B. 
Pearson himself said that Pearsonian liberal internationalism was not a set of firm 
guidelines capable of adapting to all aspects of continuous evolution international 
relations,170 one of the recurring normative themes that Canada needs to return to is 
quiet diplomacy. This has been one of the most successful tools in the past for Canadian 
foreign policy, especially when dealing with Arctic powers like the United States and 
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Russia.171 Russia has especially seemed surprisingly open to working out Arctic issues 
through diplomatic means, and quiet diplomacy would certainly be more constructive for 
Canada-Russia Arctic relations than Prime Minister Harper’s current approach. 
  While Canada does still provide a considerable amount of support for multilateral 
institutions, the Canadian government has been criticized for failing to commit tangible 
resources over the past 15 years.172 Continuing to move away from multilateralism could 
be detrimental to Canada’s image. Indeed, one could argue that it is hypocritical for a 
country that once fought for middle and smaller nations to have a larger voice in 
international institutions is now fighting to leave them out. This holds true in the Arctic, 
where Canada has remained hesitant to leverage the more inclusive Arctic Council and 
has instead been more proactive in the Arctic Five (A5), which only includes the five 
Arctic coastal states, and has been strongly criticized by the non-coastal members of the 
Arctic Council.173 
 Keating argues that countries like Canada, who have an extensive network of 
multilateral connections and commitments, have a greater responsibility to make the 
system work. He asserts that Canada’s interests require a stable international system in 
which middle powers and smaller nations have the opportunity and capability to inject 
their own views. Keating references what is termed a Groatian view of the world to 
describe Canada’s past successes in creating world order based on principles such as 
state sovereignty, liberal trading practices, and regional security:
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This is a view that privileges order above other values, in part because order served other Canadian 
interests, but also because order allowed for the pursuit of more substantive goals. These efforts may in 
part be seen as a sacrifice of principle and a commitment to process over end results. Yet in an 
environment where the failure of process can also generate a failure to achieve the desired results a 
concern for process is not inappropriate. This approach, in my view, was based on a belief that the 
process was not independent of the outcome in two critically important ways. First, that the process would 
tend to favour the outcomes more likely to meet Canadian objectives than were others. Second, that the 
process itself was a critically important form of global politics. It was not so much a matter of form 
replacing substance as much as a view that form was substance.174
He goes on to point out that since the 1940s Canada has dedicated a considerable 
amount of effort to make sure that the multilateral machinery which allows middle 
powers to affect the resolution of issues in an anarchic system dominated by great 
powers.175 Keating also makes sure to clarify that this policy is not simply some altruistic 
gesture for good of the international community, and that a significant reason for this 
policy is to reinforce Canada’s sovereignty as the country is perpetually pressured by the 
power and proximity of the United States.176 
 Indeed, the United States seems to be increasingly vehement in its opposition of 
multilateralism. While it became blatantly evident that the US had little faith in the 
effectiveness of international institutions during the years of President George W. Bush, 
there has in fact been a long standing and widespread negative view of multilateralism in 
the US. While Canada and US interests have clashed several times in international 
institutions (environmental agreements, the International Criminal Court, and the UN’s 
role in Iraq),177 it is important for Canada to try to encourage and accommodate its 
neighbour to reengage in multilateralism rather than to follow their lead and engage in a 
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unilateral foreign policy themselves, like the Harper government is currently doing. As 
this chapter previously mentioned, Canada simply does not have the capability to act 
unilaterally in an effective manner. As competition in the Arctic heats up, Canada must 
embrace multilateralism to avoid being bullied by the United States as well as Russia. 
 Canada needs to back away from the A5 and reengage with the Arctic Council. Indeed, 
it was Canadian initiative that first pressed for the creation of the five country “Arctic 
Basin Council” in the 1970’s as a means of achieving broader cooperation in the North 
by giving more leverage to the smaller states. It was also a Canadian idea to increase 
the number of states from five to eight in what would eventually become the Arctic 
Council.178
 There are two things that Canada should take the lead on in order to improve the Arctic 
Council. First, there needs to be more inclusion of non-Arctic states in the Arctic Council. 
Arctic states need to recognize that development in the Arctic has a global impact that is 
of concern to states across the globe. For example, the European Union (EU) has the 
expertise, resources and competence to contribute to Arctic development. The EU is a 
worldwide leader on climate change, a major contributor to Arctic research and to 
relevant technologies such as carbon capture and storage. Asian countries have also 
shown strong interest in the region, particularly in the new sea lanes opening up. 
However, Canada led the push suspend EU’s application for permanent observer status 
to the Arctic Council in 2009. The applications of China, Italy, and South Korea have also 
been suspended, showing strong signs that the Canadian government would prefer to 
keep the shaping of Arctic policy within the circumpolar region in order to serve national 
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interests at the expense of long-term global considerations.179 Second, Canada should 
push for an increase of the Arctic Council’s powers. Upgrading it from a “high-level” 
forum to a formal organization capable of making binding decisions. This would give the 
smaller nations in the Council more say in Arctic policy and a way of leveraging against 
the superpowers in the region.180 
 But the fact remains that even if the Canadian government were to change its stance, 
increasing the power of the Arctic Council would require a concerted effort to convince 
the United States for its support. The United States opposes any kind of legislative 
capabilities being given to the Arctic council because it believes that no organization 
should have the ability to legislate inside US territory, as it would be a considered an 
infringement on sovereignty.181 However, the no international organization can be 
considered truly effective without superpowers like the United States on board, and 
therefore attempts to persuade the United States to change its position are worthwhile. 
 While the Arctic Council continues to run into barriers, activity in the Arctic is steadily 
increasing. In order to accommodate Arctic development in a safe and efficient manner, 
Canada may have to seek multilateralism through ways outside of the existing 
institutions. Indeed, as suggested in chapter three, there is an increasing need for an 
effective regional security and pollution response force. Liberal internationalism sees 
collective security as key to Canadian sovereignty.182 Increased search and rescue 
cooperation agreements with the US and Denmark in the Beaufort Sea and Baffin bay 
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areas, along with common stockpiles of emergency response pollution equipment 
mentioned in chapter three, would be a great start.
5.2: Creating a realistic Northwest Passage policy for a middle power
 There are several approaches that the Canadian government can take to secure control 
over the Northwest Passage. However, the consequence for each approach greatly vary  
and Canada needs to be very diligent in weighing the pros and cons of each option. 
Unilateral control through the International Court of Justice
 The most effective approach for claiming the Northwest Passage as internal waters 
would be to go through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and use the precedent set 
by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. After having numerous fishermen arrested for 
fishing in what Norway claimed to be its internal waters, the United Kingdom challenged 
the validity of Norway’s self-drawn territorial baselines in the ICJ, arguing that they were 
not drawn in accordance with international law. The coastal line they were disputing was 
the Norwegian skjaergaard, which contains numerous islands, bays, straits, channels, 
and waterways. The Court ruled in Norway’s favour, essentially saying the waters 
between the base-lines of the belt of territorial waters and the mainland are internal 
waters.183 
 There are three ways that Canada can apply its sovereignty argument to the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case. First, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is similar to the 
skjaergaard because it is also made up of islands, bays, straits, channels and 
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waterways. Also, the Indreleia is a maritime strait found within a coastal body of water 
and does not depart from the general direction of the coastline, just like the Northwest 
Passage. Second, just as Norway argued that the skjaergaard waters are important for 
the communication amongst the local population. Canada can argue that the Arctic 
Archipelagos are important to Canada’s culture and national identity, as the waterways 
are a crucial part to the local aboriginals way of life. With an estimated population of 
113,000 Canadians,184 the Arctic is an important part of Canada. Third, the sea-to-land 
ratio in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is 0.82 to 1, while the ratio for the Norwegian 
skaergaard is 3.5 to 1.185 One could therefore argue that Canada actually has a stronger 
case for sovereignty over the Northwest Passage than Norway did over the skjaergaard 
waters. While winning a successful claim through the ICJ would be a big step towards 
getting international recognition of Canada’s Northwest Passage claim, there would still 
likely be the task of convincing the United States to come on board. As previously 
discussed, the United States tends to act unilaterally and often disregards international 
law. Therefore, it seems that no matter what route Canada would go through to get the 
international community to recognize the Northwest Passage as domestic waters, there 
would have to be a separate effort to gain the blessing of the United States.
 Michael Byers believes the best way to get the US to recognize the Northwest Passage 
as an international strait would be for Canada to give up some concessions on the 
Beaufort Sea boundary dispute.186
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 The Beaufort Sea rests on the boundary line between the American state of Alaska and 
Canada’s Yukon Territory. Canada and the United States have disagreed on the location 
of the Beaufort Sea boundary since 1976 when the United States protested the 
boundary line that Canada was using to issue oil and gas concessions. The next year 
both countries delineated exclusive fishing zones out to 200 nautical miles. However, 
these lines crossed over each other, and the dispute has never been settled since. What 
makes the dispute more complicated is that lucrative oil and gas reserves have been 
discovered under the seabed, and major oil companies are waiting for the dispute to be 
solved so they can begin to drill.187 
 
Figure 7: Map of Beaufort Sea maritime boundary dispute lines between Canada and United States. 
Link:http://arcticecon.wordpress.com/2011/01/10/beaufort-sea-dispute/
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 Michael Byers asserts that if Canada wants the US to recognize the Northwest Passage 
as internal waters, they may have to accept boundary lines through the Beaufort Sea 
that are much more favourable to the United States. While it is an interesting idea, Byers 
admits that it would by no means be a sure thing:
 In considering this proposal, rational actors would likely want at least three pieces of information: (1) the 
location of the new Beaufort Sea boundary lines; (2) the expected values of the resources contained in 
newly acquired areas; and (3) accurate valuations of a national and international Northwest Passage. With 
this information in hand, the question for the United States then becomes: is the United States willing to 
accept more Beaufort Sea resources in exchange for an internal Canadian Northwest Passage? Is it 
willing to trade acquiescence to Canada’s internal waters claim to the Northwest Passage for a larger 
share of Beaufort Sea oil?188
 Byers goes on to acknowledge that Canada would be the likely winner of this deal, 
because the United States would be giving up its rights in the Northwest Passage in 
exchange for access to more potential oil and gas reserves. Canada on the other hand 
would not be too concerned about giving up some of its oil reserves in exchange for full 
control over a potentially lucrative Northern trade route, especially because Canada 
already has the world’s second-largest proven reserves of oil.189 Therefore, this deal is 
by no means a sure thing, 
 As mentioned earlier, Canada simply does not have the capability to effectively manage 
the Northwest Passage on its own. Unilaterally controlling the Passage would be a 
substantial economic investment that would likely come at the expense of other foreign 
policy initiatives in other parts of the globe. With Canada’s trade becoming increasingly 
continentally centric, this is just not a wise approach.190 For this reason, abandoning the 
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Harper government’s complex neorealist approach and a return to liberal internationalist 
foreign policy is what is needed in the Arctic.
Multilateral control through the Arctic Council
 Professors Douglas Johnston and Franklyn Griffiths have advocated for a Pearson style 
functionalist approach through the Arctic Council. They believe that the Council will 
enable the states with vested interest in the Northwest Passage to develop rules to 
apply to the waterway. They think this would be the most cost effective way of 
developing a viable sea route.191 If the EU and other interested states were granted 
permanent observer status, this would provide a very effective platform to develop a 
shipping policy with input from many different interests. However, the fact remains that 
the United States strongly opposes increasing the legislative power of the Arctic Council, 
and this does not appear to be likely to change anytime in the near future. 
 The idea of going through the Arctic Council is definitely a good start. Even shipping 
industry leaders agree that the beneficiaries of the international community must 
contribute fees to fund assistance of transiting vessels by Arctic icebreakers, as well as 
contribute to investment costs, share expertise in designing icebreakers and assist in 
construction.192 
 Indeed, countries as far away as Japan and China seem willing to contribute. Both 
countries see themselves as primary economic beneficiaries of new sea lanes and 
hydrocarbon reserves, and would like to see peaceful, constructive resolutions to the 
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territorial disputes in the Arctic.193 China especially could become a big player in the 
Arctic. Chinese oil companies have invested billions of dollars in over 120 oil projects all 
over the world, and views the Arctic as an attractive frontier. China’s economy is also 
overwhelmingly export focused, with approximately half of its gross domestic product 
dependent on shipping. Therefore China is looking for any shortcut that it can find to its 
key markets, and the Arctic is no exception.194
Multilateral control through the International Maritime Organization 
 It is important that Canada does not give in to the assumption that without unilateral 
control over the Northwest Passage the safety, security, environmental protection, and 
sovereignty of its Arctic Archipelago will be sacrificed.195 In fact, when considering 
Canada’s insufficient ability to control and monitor the Passage, one could argue that 
those four things would be in more danger under unilateral control. Further, the safety, 
security, and environmental protection of the Northwest Passage is of concern to all who 
intend to use it, not just to Canada.196 This means there is a great opportunity for 
Canada to oversee a multilateral effort to develop and regulate the Northwest Passage. 
Canada must realize that it is possible to recognize the Northwest Passage as an 
international strait and still have a considerable degree of sovereignty over it. 
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 Canada can therefore best secure its interests under the framework of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO is the UN agency that specializes in developing 
standards for shipping and the oceans. This organization has already adopted dozens of 
treaties and hundreds of guidelines, codes, and recommendations, and Canada should 
lead efforts to create a regime that is applicable to the Arctic.197 
 According to James Kraska, many of the treaties already in place can be strengthened 
and extended for application to the Arctic Ocean, and can thus accommodate Canada’s 
sensitivities and concerns within a strong, stable framework that is universally accepted. 
For example, chapter V of the annexed regulations accommodates the establishment of 
ship-routing measures and reporting systems that can be made mandatory under IMO 
approval if justified by the volume of traffic or degree of risk.198 This certainly seems to 
indicate that any country intending to use the Northwest Passage would have to help 
ensure that ship-routing and reporting measures were effective, which would be much 
cheaper and more productive than Canada’s current arbitrary unilateral efforts. Kraska 
points out that the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters could be 
strengthened, as well as made mandatory, which would allow Canada to control which 
types of vessels are approved to traverse the Northwest Passage.199         
 Kraska also thinks that Canada could replicate its tough laws protecting marine ecology 
in a multilateral context through the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). This convention contains six appendixes that deal with 
oil pollution, chemical pollution, harmful substances in packaged form, sewage, garbage 
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and air pollution. Other Conventions address the dumping of wastes at sea, as well as 
the right of coastal states to intervene if their coastline is under threat of pollution.200 
These Conventions could certainly help allay fears that the well-being of Canada’s Arctic 
ecosystem would no longer be in their hands.
 Canada should also fight for a convention that addresses the concerns of the Arctic’s 
indigenous population, as they need to have a voice in any type of planning which would 
have an adverse effect on their livelihood, as an international Northwest Passage regime 
surely would. 
 According to Kraska, the IMO has already proven to be an effective international 
organization when it comes to strengthening sovereignty, security, marine safety, and 
environmental protection through a process called the “Cooperative Mechanism.” He 
points to the example of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and how the IMO helped 
the littoral nations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore develop a governance regime 
to manage the straits. 
 After two years of negotiations between more than thirty nations, a groundbreaking 
agreement between the strait states and user states was reached that addressed 
cooperation in safety, security, and environmental protection in the straits. There is now 
a forum for regular dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage specific projects, 
and a fund to receive and manage financial contributions. The agreement is supported 
by maritime powers such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.201 
Heffernan                                                                                                                                                   78   
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid, pp.1132.
 While Canada would certainly give up more sovereignty by going through the IMO in 
comparison with some of the other approaches, the fact is this is the most effective 
means of developing and monitoring the Northwest Passage in a realistic way. At the 
current rate, Canada would not be able to unilaterally accommodate the rapidly growing 
international interest in Arctic shipping routes. A multilateral effort through the IMO would 
ensure that Canada develops the Northwest Passage in a cost-effective, and organized 
manner. Moreover, this would be returning to what Canada has historically been known 
for in the diplomatic world- multilateral leadership. Liberal Internationalism has been 
Canada’s most dominant foreign policy because it is the most effective one, and the 
Harper government’s attempt at complex neorealism has not resulted in any substantial 
foreign policy gains, especially in the Arctic. Simply put, it is time to learn from history 
and return to Canada’s liberal internationalist roots.  
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Conclusion
 The main aim of this thesis has been to analyze Canada’s current foreign policy, with a 
specific focus on its efforts to claim the Northwest Passage as internal waters, from a 
critical perspective. The eventual conclusion is that Canada should move away from the 
current complex neorealist approach it is taking and re-embrace liberal internationalism 
in order formulate the most effective Northwest Passage policy. 
 While the complex neorealist approach in the Arctic has won political points in the 
media for Prime Minister Harper’s government, it has very little diplomatic or economic 
success to show. In fact, the strategy has instead had a negative effect, damaging 
diplomatic relations with the United States, the European Union, and Russia among 
others. It has also led to ambitious promises of a unilaterally run Northwest Passage that 
the Canadian government cannot afford to manage in any effective manner. Continuing 
with this strategy will likely hurt Canada’s Arctic ambitions rather than achieve them.
 Canada therefore needs to return to its liberal internationalist foreign policy roots. In the 
past, multilateralism is what made Canada successful in international relations, and 
abandoning it under the illusion that Canada has become a principle power is not a 
constructive strategy in the north. While there is a nationalistic temptation for Canada to 
claim sole ownership over the Passage, the reality is that it would be managed much 
more effectively as an international strait. While this may seem like a loss, it is actually 
more cost-effective and beneficial to Canada in comparison to the considerable 
economic burden of managing the strait unilaterally. Further, if more private and state 
actors are contributing to development and security of the strait, it is likely that other 
industries in the Canadian Arctic will greatly benefit at a faster rate. 
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 Chapter one of this thesis went over Canada’s history of the Arctic from the 1845 
Franklin expedition until current day. It covered security dilemmas in the Northwest 
Passage like the Manhattan and Polar Sea voyages. It then discussed the emerging 
security implications that are a result of the melting ice and consequential growing of 
interests in Arctic resources and shipping lanes. It broke down these security 
implications by looking at some of the main Arctic players like Canada, United States, 
Russia, NATO, and the Arctic Council.
 Chapter two looked at the potential economic benefits of a more accessible Arctic. 
Melting ice and new technologies are making a number of resources more exploitable. 
This includes oil and gas, mining, and alternative forms of energy. On the same token, 
northern shipping routes are becoming more viable, including the Northwest Passage.  
Additionally, since the Northwest Passage goes through the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago, Canada stands to benefit substantially from increased use and 
development of the Passage. While there is expected to be mostly destination shipping 
in the area in the near future, international shipping through Canada’s north will continue 
to increase as the ice continues to melt a faster rate.
 Chapter three examined the challenges to developing the Canadian Arctic. It 
demonstrated that there are substantial environmental risks, since the Arctic is one of 
the most fragile ecosystems on earth and even a single oil spill could have a disastrous 
impact. This risk is increased twofold due to the fact that the indigenous people’s culture 
and way of life relies heavily on the Arctic coastline, and therefore they need to have a 
say in any plan to develop the Northwest Passage. The chapter then focused on the 
critical issue of the lack of infrastructure in Canada’s Arctic. Any kind of development in 
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the Passage is going to require an effective network of infrastructure throughout the 
Arctic Archipelago. Other barriers to developing the Passage were also discussed, such 
as dangerous multi-year ice, lack of capable icebreakers, lack of effective surveillance 
and radar capability, and the unpredictability of annual ice-patterns. 
 Chapter four went over the three prevailing theoretical perspectives of Canadian foreign 
policy. The first theory discussed was the peripheral dependency theory. This theory 
asserts that Canada is a small, penetrated power that mostly mimics the foreign policy of 
the United States. However, there are many holes in this theory, including its seemingly 
intentional ignorance of Canada’s relations with other countries and the role it plays in 
international organizations. The second theory examined was liberal internationalism, 
which was pioneered by Lester B. Pearson and regarded Canada as a middle power 
that strongly advocates more legislative power in international institutions for middle and 
smaller powers. The central pillar of liberal internationalism is multilateralism, and this 
thesis argues that this is the best platform on which to push forward Canadian Arctic 
interests. The third theory is complex neorealism, which asserts that Canada is a 
principle power on the rise, with a heavy interest in staying in the top tier of the global 
order. This thesis argues that the current Canadian government being run by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper is executing this form of foreign policy in the Arctic to no avail. 
 Chapter five starts by advocating for a return to multilateralism in Canada’s Arctic policy. 
Canada has historically been a leader in multilateralism and could therefore make huge 
contributions to improving cooperation in Arctic development. Continuing to turn away 
from multilateralism by blocking other states from participating in Arctic related forums is 
counterproductive and hypocritical of Canada. The chapter then goes over several 
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platforms that Canada can go through in order to secure an internationally recognized 
Northwest Passage policy. The first platform discussed is the option of going through the 
International Court of Justice and basing a case on the precedent set by the  Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case. While Canada would have a good chance of winning this 
case and having international law recognize the Northwest Passage as Canadian 
internal waters, it is unlikely that the United States would accept the decision. Moreover, 
it has been pointed out several times in this project that Canada is not capable of 
managing the Passage unilaterally. The next option discussed was to use the Arctic 
Council as a platform. However, the Council does not have the legislative power to 
broker such a deal, and is unlikely to have any in the near future with strong opposition 
from the United States persisting. The final option discussed was for Canada to go 
through the International Maritime Organization. While this option would require Canada 
to make some sacrifices and recognize the Passage as an international strait, it would 
be the most cost effective and beneficial strategy for Canada on all fronts considered. 
 After closely examining the options, it seems that Canada needs to swallow its pride 
and accept that the Northwest Passage is better off as an international strait. 
Stefansson’s prophecy of the path of supremacy’s northward movement seems to be 
occurring, and the best way for Canada to take advantage is through embracing 
multilateralism through a liberal internationalist foreign policy once again.         
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